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During interaction with others, we perceive and produce social actions in close temporal
distance or even simultaneously. It has been argued that the motor system is involved
in perception and action, playing a fundamental role in the handling of actions produced
by oneself and by others. But how does it distinguish in this processing between
self and other, thus contributing to self-other distinction? In this paper we propose a
hierarchical model of sensorimotor coordination based on principles of perception-action
coupling and predictive processing in which self-other distinction arises during action and
perception. For this we draw on mechanisms assumed for the integration of cues for a
sense of agency, i.e., the sense that an action is self-generated. We report results from
simulations of different scenarios, showing that the model is not only able to minimize
free energy during perception and action, but also showing that the model can correctly
attribute sense of agency to own actions.
Keywords: active inference, predictive processing, perception-action coupling, intentionality, social brain,
mirroring, sense of agency, cognitive model
1. INTRODUCTION
In everyday social interaction we constantly try to deduce and predict the underlying intentions
behind others’ social actions, like facial expressions, speech, gestures, or body posture. This is
no easy problem and the underlying cognitive mechanisms and neural processes even have been
dubbed the “dark matter” of social neuroscience (Przyrembel et al., 2012). Generally, action
recognition is assumed to rest upon principles of prediction-based processing (Clark, 2013),
where predictions about expected sensory stimuli are continuously formed and evaluated against
incoming sensory input to inform further processing. Such a predictive processing does not only
inform our perception of actions of others, but also our action production in which we constantly
predict the sensory consequences of our own actions and correct them in case of deviations.
Both of these processes are assumed to be supported by the structure of the human sensorimotor
system that is characterized by perception-action coupling (Prinz, 1997) and common coding of
the underlying representations.
It seems natural to assume that these general mechanisms of prediction-based action processing
underly also the perception and generation of social behavior when we interact with others.
However, in dynamic social interaction, perception, and action often need to be at work
simultaneously and for both, actions of self and other. If the motor system is to be involved in both
processes, this simultaneous processing and attribution of actions to oneself and the interaction
partner must be maintained during social interaction without confusion.
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As of yet, it is not clear how self-other distinction is reflected
in, or possibly even constituted by the sensorimotor system.
What role does it play in distinguishing social actions of the
self and the other? What are the underlying prediction-based
processes? And how do they interact with higher-level cognitive
processes like mentalizing to solve the social differentiation
problem? Evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that
the motor systems may be involved differentiately in processing
self-action and other-action, indicating a role in social cognition
(Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006) and the selective attribution of
beliefs, desires, and intentions during the dynamic process of
intersubjective sense-making. We contribute a computational
modeling perspective. In previous work we devised a model
of the interplay of mentalizing and prediction-based mirroring
during social interaction (Kahl and Kopp, 2015). In that work
two virtual agents interacted in a communication game, each
of which equipped with models of a mirroring system and
a mentalizing system, respectively. This demonstrated how
mentalizing—even with minimal abilities to account for beliefs,
desires, and intentions—affords interactive grounding andmakes
communication more robust and efficient. However, both agents
took separate and successive turns such that their mirroring
systems worked either for perception or production of social
actions (albeit with activations being carried on).
In this paper, we present an extended Bayesian model of
a sensorimotor system based on a prediction-based processing
hierarchy, called Hierarchical Predictive Belief Update (HPBU).
Our aim is to explore how such a prediction-based sensorimotor
system can be able to differentiate by itself actions of its
own (predicted for production) from potential actions of the
interaction partner (predicted for perception), thus contributing
to self-other distinction in social interaction.
For our computational model of sensorimotor processes and
the model of sense of agency we rely on assumptions from
the predictive processing framework. Specifically, the model
will rely on principles of active inference and free energy
minimization (Friston et al., 2010) based on assumptions in
accord with the predictive brain hypotheses (Clark, 2013)
and hierarchical predictive coding (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
From that follows a hierarchical organization of ever more
abstract predictive representations. These representations are
also generative processes, which together form a hierarchical
generative model which maps from (hidden) causes in the world
to their perceived (sensory) consequences. The tight coupling
between action and perception in active inference means, that
following prediction errors, either the model hypotheses have
to be updated or action in the world is necessary to make
future sensory evidence meet the model predictions. Free energy
is merely the term for the negative log model evidence of a
perceived event given the model prediction, i.e., the prediction
error which is to be minimized. Technically, variational free
energy is an upper bound on Bayesian model evidence, such that
minimizing free energy corresponds to minimizing (precision-
weighted) prediction error—or, equivalently, maximizing model
evidence or marginal likelihood.
Also, we will identify, integrate and then test mechanisms
and processes in the SoA (sense of agency) literature that are
compatible with a predictive processing view and that have
reliably been identified to contribute to sense of agency. Our
goal here is to present a conceptual computational model
of the sense of agency which is functionally embedded in a
hierarchical predictive processing model for action production
and perception. The model of sense of agency itself integrates
different aspects important for sensorimotor processing and
motor control. At the core of our argument for the presented
modeling approach is the assumption that we strongly rely on
the predictability of our own body to be able to not only identify
our own hands or arms, but also to differentiate between our own
and other’s actions through the information gathered especially
on the unpredictability of others. It is that unpredictability
of their actions and its timing that can help to differentiate.
The functional simulation at the end of our paper helps to
evaluate whether the identified mechanisms implemented in the
model are sufficient to correctly infer own actions, given altered
feedback to its action production.
We start with introducing HPBU and how it forms, tests,
and corrects so-called motor beliefs. Then we discuss how this
model can be extended with a mechanism for differentiating
between actions produced by oneself from actions produced
by a potential interlocutor in social situations. The mechanism
includes the ability to flexibly integrate predictive and postdictive
cues to form a sense of agency (SoA). Finally, we present results
from simulations that test the model’s ability to infer SoA for
its own actions in different test scenarios. We then discuss our
results with the literature concerning the mechanisms underlying
SoA and discuss the mechanism’s implications for the process of
attributing beliefs during communication.
2. HIERARCHICAL PREDICTIVE BELIEF
UPDATE
We adopt a Bayesian approach to computationally model the
human sensorimotor system at a functional level. The model,
called Hierarchical Predictive Belief Update (HPBU) realizes an
active inference and free energy minimization. Doing so it is able
to form, test, and correct so-called motor beliefs in perception
and production of actions. Based on our previous work
(Sadeghipour and Kopp, 2010) and other attempts to model the
sensorimotor system (Wolpert et al., 2003), we chose to make use
of a hierarchical representation of increasing abstractions over
representations of movement. Each level contains a generative
model that infers probabilities to perceive (and produce) these
variants of abstractions over actions in the form of discrete
probability distributions about discrete representations that can
be influenced both bottom-up, in the form of evidence for its
last prediction from the next lower level, and top-down in the
form of a prediction by the next higher level. Following the
assumption that the main flow of information is top-down and
that motor control is also just top-down sensory prediction
or “active inference," all levels receive their next higher level’s
prediction and evaluate it for their own bottom-up prediction
in the next time step. The distinction to previous models of the
sensorimotor system is that in active inference we solely rely on
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each level’s generative process to map from (hidden) causes to
their (sensory) consequences. Without separate inverse models
the generative process itself is inverted to predict the next steps in
the next lower level and thus, explain away or suppress prediction
errors. In the lowest level of the hierarchy this suppression can
take the form of triggering the production of actions and change
the environment as to minimize prediction errors.
The representations in our hierarchy code for both, the
perception and production of an action and in that follow the
common-coding theory of perception-action coupling (Prinz,
1997), a defining characteristic for representations in the mirror
neuron system (Gallese et al., 1996). The human mirror neuron
system has indeed also been attributed to have a hierarchical
organization, which is distributed across interconnected brain
areas (Grafton and Hamilton, 2007) and similarly, predictive
coding and active inference have repeatedly been linked to
the mechanisms underlying the function of the mirror neuron
system (Kilner et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2010).
Also, in the predictive coding and active inference literature
the attribution of agency was attributed to rely on mechanisms
central also to the model presented in this paper, i.e., the
correct prediction of the consequences of producing actions of
handwriting (Friston et al., 2011). But other than themechanisms
we will later go into, they rely heavily on the proprioceptive
information which is missing when perceiving other’s actions
in contrast to actions performed by oneself. We will argue that
there is sufficient information already available in the visual
information only.
HPBU can be described as a three-level hierarchy of motor
beliefs as abstractions over primitive motor acts (see Figure 1).
At the top, in the Schema level (C) we represent abstract
clusters of action sequences grouped by similarity. Below that,
the Sequence level (S) represents sequences of motor acts. Levels
in our hierarchy are loosely associated with the following (sub-
)cortical structures: The Vision level corresponds to early level
V5 in the visual cortex for its direction selectivity in the
perception of motion, while the Motor Control level corresponds
to the reflex arcs embedded in the tight coordination of
basal ganglia, spinal cord, and cerebellum. The Sequence and
Schema levels are loosely associated with primary motor and
premotor areas that code for representing action sequences.
We assume these representations to be the basis for active
inference for both action perception and production. Further,
we assume the representations to be multimodal, i.e., combining
visual, motor, and proprioceptive aspects of action, if available.
Consequently, they are used as more or less high-level or
visuomotor representations of action and their outcomes. This
is based on converging evidence for the multimodal nature of
representations that can be found in somatosensory, primary
motor, and premotor areas of the human brain, which can code
for both visual and proprioceptive information (Wise et al.,
1997; Graziano et al., 2000; Fogassi and Luppino, 2005; Pipereit
et al., 2006; Gentile et al., 2015). The lowest levels in the
model hierarchy allow for action production and visual and
proprioceptive input and feedback in the form of two separate
models; the Vision level (V) andMotor Control level (M) that will
be further described below.
FIGURE 1 | Hierarchical Predictive Belief Update, based on predictive
processing and perception-action coupling. Predictions are sent top-down
and compared with sensory (bottom-up) evidence to drive belief updates
within the hierarchy. We have loose associations with the displayed cortical
and subcortial structures. The connections shown will be explained in great
detail below. At the top, in the Schema level (C) we represent abstract clusters
of action sequences grouped by similarity. Below that, the Sequence level (S)
represents sequences of motor acts. The lowest levels in the model hierarchy
allow for action production, and proprioceptive feedback in Motor Control level
(M) and visual input and action feedback in the Vision level (V ). Red and blue
lines represent bottom-up and top-down information propagation, respectively.
The blue dotted line from V represents a visual prediction without any effect on
the world, while the blue line from M has a causal effect. The red dotted line
from M represents a long range connection, further explained below.
2.1. Motor Coordination
In motor control two problems have to be solved. First, how
to learn action sequences in order to reach a goal, i.e., a
mapping from an extrinsic coordinate frame (describing the
action perception) into an intrinsic frame (describing the muscle
movement) and second, how to activate the appropriate muscles
to reach a goal, i.e., from an intrinsic frame to an extrinsic frame
to produce the desired movement. What makes this problem
hard is that there are many possibilities how the intrinsic frame
could produce the extrinsic frame.
To solve the problem of action production toward a goal often
the planning of an optimal trajectory was assumed using forward
models trying to find an optimal sequence of muscle activations
leading to the reached goal before the action even starts (Kawato,
1999). Todorov and Jordan (2002) brought up a different solution
trying to explain the high variability in the detailed movements
that occured even in repeated actions. They proposed a control
strategy that allowed for variability in redundant task dimensions
during the action production. That is, during action production
feedback is used to only correct variability that interferes with
reaching the goal. The use of feedback was often discussed in this
context, famously the MOSAIC model by Wolpert et al. (2003)
proposed how using a comparison of produced action and its
sensory feedback could stabilize and guide action.What counts as
feedback in this context are the visually perceived positions of the
joints controlled by the muscles and the proprioceptive feedback
by the muscle spindles surrounding the muscles.
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An important distinction on such models of optimal control
is highlighted by Friston (2011) in that the forward models in
motor control are not the generative models used in perceptual
inference and hence should not be conflated. He argues that
one could get rid of the forward models for action by replacing
the control problem with an inference problem over motor
reflex arcs and in that simplifying optimal control to be active
inference. In active inference the extrinsic frame can be utilized
as action-production tools, to circumvent the need for detailed
programming of motor commands.
We follow this argumentation. First, we transform the
perceived action into a gaze- or vision-centered oculomotor
frame of reference that has been shown to also code the visual
targets for reaching and other actions (Russo and Bruce, 1996;
Engel et al., 2002; Ambrosini et al., 2012). Using those we are
also able to circumvent the need for detailed programming of
motor commands. Instead, the oculocentric frame of reference
can guide the actions or parts of an action.
The lowest levels of the hierarchy represent two aspects
in active inference that are necessary for motor coordination.
The Vision level receives continuous coordinates of a writing
trajectory at discrete points in time, which is perceived in the
form of a discrete probability distribution over a discrete set
of writing angles at each point in time. Following the narrative
by Zacks et al. (2007) and Gumbsch et al. (2017) on event
segmentation using surprise as a separator, we identify surprising
deviations of the current writing angle given the writing angles of
the past. In the context of free energy minimization, a sudden
increase in the amplitude of prediction errors—induced by a
surprising event—is reflected by free energy increases in the
Vision level. The surprising stroke consists of the writing angle
and its length, which are both transformed into the oculocentric
reference frame, i.e., into relative polar coordinates with the last
surprising stroke coordinates at its center. This information is
send to the Sequence level, together with the time passed since the
last surprising stroke. The Sequence level stores these sequences
of surprising events in the oculocentric reference frame, which
can also be used for generation. Following the argument by
Friston (2011) we circumvent the need for detailed programming
of motor commands by utilizing the surprising events consisting
of relative polar coordinates as action targets, which are send to
theMotor control level. There, a reflex arc in the form of a damped
spring system (inspired by Ijspeert et al., 2013) will realize the
motion toward the action target following simple equations of
motion with the spring’s point of equilibrium at the relative polar
coordinate of the action target. This implementation of active
inference is formally related to the equilibrium point hypothesis
(Feldman and Levin, 1995). In other words, the top-down or
descending predictions of the proprioceptive consequences of
movement are regarded as setting and equilibrium or set point to
which the motor plant converges, via the engagement of motor
reflexes. This will later be explained in more detail.
An important aspect inmotor coordinationmodel can be seen
in Figure 1, where theMotor Control level has no direct feedback
connection to the Sequence level. This is for three reasons. First,
we would like to see if sequential motor coordination as well
as the inference of a sense of agency are possible with visual
feedback only. Second, other than Friston et al. (2011) who rely
heavily on proprioceptive information we want to allow for visual
input to drive motor coordination and a sense of agency. Instead,
we close the motor coordination loop using a direct long range
connection that is used by the Motor Control level to inform
the Vision level when it is done coordinating actions to reach
a subgoal (see red dotted line in Figure 1). Vision level will
then check if visual information can confirm the movement,
then sending the information to the Sequence level, closing the
motor coordination loop. Third, making the model’s sequence
coordination independent from direct proprioceptive feedback
allows for future developments that can associate actions in the
world with intended effects that not directly influence the motor
system, e.g., switching on a light or influencing another agent’s
beliefs.
During action perception, we further assume that the
correspondence problem is solved in the sense that an observed
action by another agent is mapped into one’s own body-centered
frame of reference. That is, we feed the perceived action trajectory
directly and bottom-up intoHPBU. The next sectionwill describe
the active inference and free energy minimization in the model
hierarchy.
3. MODEL UPDATE DETAILS
The HPBU model is defined as a hierarchical generative model
which learns to predict and explain away prediction errors
and in this sense minimize the free energy. This section will
briefly introduce our free energy minimization strategy and the
generative model updates, which we have implemented and
extended to encompass and allow the distinction of self and other
in the context of action production.
In the hierarchical generative model, each level maps the
internal discrete state space from one level in the hierarchy to
the domain of its next lower level. Each level contains a discrete
probability distribution about that level’s discrete states. The
difference between continuous and discrete states in the context
of active inference is well discussed in Friston et al. (2017a). All
levels of the hierarchy are updated sequentially starting at the top
in Schema level C, i.e., they are updated in sequence from its next
higher and next lower levels, learning to represent and produce
the states in the next lower level and the environment. At the top,
the Schema level C represents clusters of similar representations
of its next lower level, which is the Sequence level S. S represents
sequences of representations of Vision level V that occured over
time. Also, representations that can map to V are compatible
with representations in Motor Control level M. In each level
posteriors are updated bottom-up and top-down and free energy
is calculated with respect to prior and posterior distributions as
described in the following. These mappings can be understood
as generative processes, where one level predicts the states of the
level below. In the Motor Control levelM this mapping results in
action production.
3.1. Free Energy Minimization
Free energy describes the negative log model evidence of a
generative model that tries to explain hidden states, i.e., the
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environment. Evidence corresponds to probabilities of data from
the environment, given the model at hand.
The free energy in systemX is expressed as the sum of surprise
and a cross entropy of two states (a posterior P, and a prior Q
before evidence has arrived). When free energy is minimized the
cross entropy becomes zero, thus leaving free energy to be just
surprise (entropy with regard to the posterior) (Equation 1).











In our interpretation the difference between perception and
production lies in the question which signal drives the updates
in calculating free energy, the bottom-up signal or the top-down
signal? When it comes to calculating free energy in perception
the posterior distribution (for calculating surprise and the cross-
entropy) is the top-down signal Ptd and the prior, i.e., the driving
signal is the bottom-up signal Pbu, so that F = H(Ptd) +
DKL(Ptd||Pbu). In production the top-down signal Ptd becomes
the driving signal for the free energy update F = H(Pbu) +
DKL(Pbu||Ptd). The deviation is then calculated with respect to
Pbu (see the yellow box in Figure 2). To update level beliefs, both
posteriors will be combined to form the current level posterior
Pt , in which the bottom-up signal will be combined similarly
as in the identified microcircuitry for predictive coding (Bastos
et al., 2012). There, connections between cortical columns are
mostly inhibitory. In this setting, the bottom-up and top-down
posteriors in Equation (1) play the role of predictions. Thismeans
that we can treat the differences in the bottom-up and top-
down predictions as a prediction error and enter them into a
Kalman filter. In this formulation, the Kalman gain is used to
differentially weight bottom-up and top-down predictions and
plays the role of a precision. Crucially, this precision is a function
of the free energy computed at each level in the hierarchical
model—such that a very high free energy (i.e., prediction error)
emphasizes top-down predictions. We model this effect during
perception as a top-down inhibitory influence on the bottom-
up signal using a Kalman filter Pt = Pbu + Kt(Ptd − Pbu)
with a Kalman gain Kt =
F
F+π calculated from the level free
energy F and precision π to integrate this filter into the model
context (see below in Equation 5 for a more detailed description).
Again, the current driving signal can invert the belief update so
that during production Pt = Ptd + Kt(Pbu − Ptd). The level
posterior Pt will be send to the next higher level in the hierarchy
and to the next lower level. In the following time step the level
posterior will be used as an empirical prior for calculating Pbu and
Ptd respectively. Figure 2 examplifies our belief update scheme
in Sequence level S. There posteriors and relevant likelihoods
are combined to calculate updated top-down and bottom-up
posteriors necessary to calculate the free energy within level S
and the final belief update step which combines top-down and
bottom-up posteriors. For more details on our generative model
hierarchy please refer to the Supplementary Materials.
Following the assumption in active inference that overt action
is basically action-oriented predictive processing (Friston et al.,
2010), we allow strongly predicted next actions of representations
in the Sequence level to be acted out. Without any constraints
this leads to overt automatic enactment, similar to the automatic
imitation seen in patients suffering from echopraxia (Ganos et al.,
2012). To control this motor execution, we introduced a gating
signal into the top-level of the hierarchy, which acts as a motor
intention for a specific schema, including a strong boost of this
schema’s probability (acting as a trigger to act-out an abstract
motor belief). This intention percolates down the hierarchy to
boost associated representations and inform the intention to
act. Once it reaches the lowest level of the hierarchy, the act to
produce the motor representation will be allowed.
3.2. Motor Coordination Loop
In active inference and the actual production of an action,
predictions guide the minimization of free energy, the Motor
level receives position (xi) and timing (1t) goals from Sequence
level S. The realization of the movement goal within the Motor
Control level is left to an action-proprioception loop modeled as
a dampened spring system. This models the angular movements
of a single joint, which in our simulations will represent a
writing pencil. A similar approach was used by Friston et al.
(2011) but instead of a system with two joints following one
attractor-state at a time in attractor space we model just one joint
which moves toward the spring system’s point of equilibrium
at the relative polar coordinate of the action goal. To allow for
smooth and curving trajectories that are similar to handwriting
in spatial and temporal properties, we were inspired by work on
dynamic movement primitives (DMP) that are used for modeling
attractor behaviors of autonomous non-linear dynamical systems
with the help of statistical learning techniques (Ijspeert et al.,
2013). We will not make use of the DMPs ability to learn and
reproduce trajectories, but will configure a dampened spring
system similarly to a DMP and instead of applying a forcing
term that activates the system’s non-linear dynamics over time
we make use of an obstacle avoidance technique mentioned in
Hoffmann et al. (2009) which we adpoted and inverted its force
to actually move toward the goal in a forcing function g (see
Equation 2). The reason for this is that when we simply applied
the spring system to each goal sequentially, we would accelerate
toward and slow down at the goal. To keep up the momentum
we need to look ahead several goals xi+3 (here 3 steps ahead)
in the core spring system, but with a goal forcing function that
sequentially tries to visit each goal xi. α = 25,β = 6.25, γ = 10,
and µ = 1
π
are constants that specify the behavior of the system.
ϕ is the angle to the goal (or its velocity, see Equation 3) and y is
the current position.
ϕ = ϕxi − ϕy˙
ϕ˙ = γ ϕ e−µ|ϕ| (2)
g = (xi − y) ϕ˙
y¨ = α(β(xi+3 − y)− y˙)+ g (3)
With this hierarchical model in place, we set out to investigate
how a sensorimotor system can distinguish activations that stem
from own actions from those arising due to the observation of
an interaction partner’s actions. In particular we are interested
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FIGURE 2 | To exemplify the belief update scheme in HPBU, here the updating of posteriors and free energy within Sequence level S are shown. Within S the
top-down and bottom-up posteriors are calculated from posteriors of C and V. That information is used to update free energy either for production (prod) or for
perception (perc). The updated free energy and precision (π ) are used to calculate the Kalman gain necessary for calculating the level posterior P(S) using a Kalman
filter, again either for production or perception. The green boxes show the calculated likelihoods necessary for updating within S or in the levels above and below
(Pbu(C|S) is one example). For more details please refer to the Supplementary Materials.
in how self-other distinction is realized within the system itself
based on its prediction-based processing. This ability would be a
prerequisite for the assumed dual use of the sensorimotor system
(in perception and action) in dynamic social interaction. Note
that, at a higher cognitive level, self-other distinction will have
additional components based on sensory modalities like vision
(e.g., seeing who the agent of an action is) or proprioception,
as well as awareness of control of own actions (e.g., feeling or
knowing that one is executing an action). Here we are interested
in how a more fundamental sensorimotor basis for self-other
distinction can contribute in correctly attributing a perceived
sensory event to self-action or other-action—a process that would
be likely to underlie many of the these additional higher-level
components. To that end, we extended HPBU to include a
sensorimotor account of sense of agency (SoA), i.e., the sense that
an action is self-generated.
4. SELF-OTHER DISTINCTION AND SENSE
OF AGENCY
How does the human brain distinguish between information
about ourselves and others? Or to be more specific, how can
we distinguish ourselves from others so that we do not falsely
attribute an action outcome to ourselves? These questions are
related to the general mechanisms that give rise to a sense of
“feeling of control,” agency, and “self.”
Reviews on the neural mechanisms of the SoA and the
social brain (David et al., 2008; Van Overwalle, 2009) show
a strong overlap of differential activity during SoA judgement
tasks with functional brain areas of the human mirror-neuron
system and the mentalizing network. Especially noteworthy is
TPJ (temporo-parietal junction) as a candidate to infer the agency
of a social action, spanning areas STS (superior temporal sulcus)
which mainly responds to biological motion, to IPL (inferior
parietal lobule) which may respond to the intentions behind
someone’s actions, connecting to mPFC (medial prefrontal
cortex) which probably hold trait inferences or maintains
different representations of self- or other-related intentions or
beliefs (please see the mentioned reviews for a more thorough
analysis). Generally, a person’s SoA is believed to be influenced
through predictive and postdictive (inferential) processes, which
when disturbed can lead to misattributions of actions as in
disorders such as schizophrenia (van der Weiden et al., 2015).
In Schizophrenia as a deficit of sensory attenuation, but also
hallucinations, we can point to disfunctional precision encodings
as a core pathology, i.e., the confidence of beliefs about the
world (Adams et al., 2013). Precision as such is believed to be
encoded in dopaminergic neuromodulation and can as such be
linked to the sensory attenuation effects during the attribution
of agency in healthy subjects (Brown et al., 2013). We aim to
identify mechanisms in order to model these processes and their
integration into a combined SoA.
4.1. Predictive Process in Sense of Agency
The predictive process makes use of people’s ability to anticipate
the sensory consequences of their own actions. It allows to
attenuate, i.e., decrease the intensity of incoming signals which
enables people to distinguish between self-caused actions and
their outcomes and those actions and outcomes caused by others.
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One account to model these processes is based on inverse and
forward models to account for disorders of awareness in the
motor system and delusion of control (Frith et al., 2000). This
view suggests that patients suffering from such disorders of
awareness can no longer link their intentions to their actions,
that is they can become aware of the sensory consequences
of an action, but may have problems to integrate them to the
intention underlying the action, making it hard to ascribe actions
to oneself or another agent. Research on schizophrenia has shown
that reliable and early self-other integration and distinction is
important not only for the correct attribution of SoA, but also
for the correct attribution of intentions and emotions to others in
social interaction (van derWeiden et al., 2015).Weiss et al. (2011)
also showed that there is a social aspect to predictive processes
that influence SoA by comparing perceived loudness of auditory
action effects in an interactive action context. They found that
attenuation occured also in the interactive context, comparable to
the attentuation of self-generated sound in an individual context.
Another aspect of the processing of differences between
predictions and feedback from reality is the intrinsic robustness
and invariance to unimportant aspects in the sensory input.
The kinds of predictive processing hierarchies we talk about,
that concern themselves with allowing ourselves to act in (and
perceive) the ever-varying nature of our environments, are able
to ignore or explain away the prediction-errors that aren’t
surprising enough to lead to any form of adaptation. That this
is also likely true for temporal prediction-errors was found
in Sherwell et al. (2016), who using EEG saw significant N1
component suppression in predicted stimulus onset timings.
In a predictive processing perspective this is possible through
higher levels in the hierarchy correctly predicting the next lower
level’s state, and by taking into account its generative model’s
precision, minimize its prediction-error. Or as Clark states: “[...]
variable precision-weighting of sensory prediction error enables
the system to attend to current sensory input to a greater or
lesser degree, flexibly balancing reliance upon (or confidence in)
the input with reliance upon (or confidence in) its own higher
level predictions” (Clark, 2016, p. 216). Consistent with this
perspective is work by Rohde and Ernst (2016), who investigated
if and in which cases we can compensate for sensorimotor delay,
i.e., the time between an action and its sensory consequence.
They find that if an error signal (a discrepancy between an
expected and an actual sensory delay) occurs we recalibrate our
expectations only if the error occurs systematically. This kind of
temporal adaptation is a well studied finding (e.g., Haering and
Kiesel, 2015 for sense of agency or Cunningham et al., 2001 in
motor control). What interests us for the here presented model
of self-other distinction are the unexpected, unsystematic and
sudden deviations that cannot be explained away easily. These
are the temporal aspects of sensorimotor processing that we will
focus on next.
4.2. Postdictive Process in Sense of
Agency
The postdictive process relies more on inferences drawn after
the movement in order to check whether the observed events
are contingent and consistent with specific intentions (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999), influenced by higher-level causal beliefs.
One important aspect of this inferential process relies on the
temporal aspects of action-outcome integration. It was shown
that increasing action outcome delay decreases feeling of control
(Sidarus et al., 2013). Colonius and Diederich (2004) describe a
model that can explain the improved response time in saccadic
movements toward a target that is visually and auditorily aligned.
Their time-window-of-integration model serves as a framework
for the rules of multisensory integration (visual, auditory, and
somatosensory), which occurs only if all multimodal neural
excitations terminate within a given time interval. In van der
Weiden et al. (2015) this time interval of integration is taken
as a solution to a problem posed in the classic comparator
model of motor prediction. The brain needs to integrate action
production signals with their predicted effects which can be
perceived via multiple sensory channels (e.g., visual, auditory,
proprioceptive, ...). This integration needs to account for the
different time scales in which effects (or outcomes) of actions
may occur. This is where the time-window-of-integration model
can help us explain the effect such integration can have.
A point not taken into account by Colonius and Diederich
was, how such an integrating mechanism knows how long it
has to wait for all action outcomes to occur. Hillock-Dunn
and Wallace (2012) investigated how these temporal windows
for integration, which have been learned in childhood develop
through life. They analyzed responses to a judgement task of
a visual and an auditory stimulus to occur simultaneously in
participants with ages ranging from 6 to 23 years. Their analysis
showed an age dependent decrease in temporal integration
window sizes.We hypothesize that a wider window of integration
can be associated with unpredictability and greater variance in
action outcome timings and that this integration window size
decrease may be due to an adult person’s experience advantage
about effects their actions may have on their environment, or the
mere better predictability of their full grown bodies.
Such an integration of an intended action with its predicted
consequences learned through associations between action
events can lead to an interesting phenomenon, often reported
in the SoA literature. In this phenomenon an integration can
lead to the effect that predicted action consequences can be
perceived to occur at the same time. This phenomenon is called
temporal binding, or also intentional binding when the effects of
an intended action are predicted and are perceived as occurring
closer together as unintended actions that were merely observed
in an unrelated party (Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard and Clark,
2003). We have trained our sensorimotor hierarchy to allow the
model of sense of agency to be able to predict also the timing of its
intended action outcomes. This way it is able to integrate action
and consequence, while simultaneously evaluating the success of
its outcome prediction and allowing the detection of unpredicted
delays, which may be a cue for another agent’s action and their
action outcome or an outcome delayed by an unknown reason.
Being able to make such a distinction allows people to monitor,
infer, and distinguish between causal relations for own and other’s
behavior.
In sum, by and large there are two processes that can inform
SoA and hence can help to distinguish actions of self and other in
social interaction. A predictive process is based on (assumed or
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given) causes of the action, e.g., the motor command and utilizes
forward models to predict the to-be-observed sensory events. A
postdictive process works with features of an observed action
outcome and applies higher-level causal beliefs and inferential
mechanisms, e.g., a given intention to act or temporal binding,
to test the consistency of the action outcome and infer a likely
explanation.
How are these two processes integrated to inform SoA
and what if their cues are unreliable? When disorders of SoA
were first studied, the comparator model was the first proposal
concerning its underlying mechanism. This was soon questioned
as the comparator model failed to account for external agency
attributions. It was argued that its evidence has to be weighted
and integrated with more high-level sources of evidence for sense
of agency (Synofzik et al., 2008). Such a weighting and integration
of evidence cues was first studied by Moore et al. (2009),
who found that external cues like prior beliefs become more
influential if predictive cues are absent. Neurological evidence
for a differential processing of cues that inform SoA comes
from Nahab et al. (2010), who found in an imaging study that
there is a leading and a lagging network that both influence
SoA prior to and after an action. The leading network would
check whether a predicted action outcome is perceived, while
the lagging network would process these cues further to form a
SoA that is consciously experienced. Further, an EEG study found
evidence for separate processing areas in the brain (Dumas et al.,
2012). There, predictive and postdictive cues were triggered in
two tasks. One induced an external attribution of agency, while
the other used a spontaneuous attribution condition. It seems
that in order to generate SoA, both systems do not necessarily
have to work perfectly together. Instead, there is evidence that
the SoA is based on a weighted integration of predictive and
postdictive cues based on their precision (Moore and Fletcher,
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013; Wolpe et al., 2014). Furthermore, the
fluency of action-selection processesmay also influence self-other
distinction because the success of repeatedly predicting the next
actions seem to accumulate over time to inform SoA (Chambon
and Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2014). This action selection
fluency aspect seems to contribute prospectively to a sense of
agency, similar to a priming effect.
4.3. Estimating Sense of Agency During
Action and Perception
During online social interaction, the sensorimotor system
potentially gets involved in simultaneous action perception
and production processes. Our goal is to investigate how
our prediction-based HPBU model can cope with the social
differentiation problem during such dual-use situations. To that
end we integrate three cues that arise in predictive and postdictive
processes, into a SoA for produced actions which will depend on
the likelihood calculated in the Sequence level: In the predictive
process, we calculate the likelihood of the perceived action
sequence s′, given the predicted action sequence si ∈ S in the
sequence comparison function ι(s′, si). In the postdictive process,
we have the intention to act and the delay in the action-outcome
for temporal binding. This temporal binding depends on the
predicted and perceived temporal delay of the predicted action,
and the sequence level’s precision. Precision in this context
will stretch or sharpen the likelihood of temporal binding (see
Equation 4 and refer to Supplementary Materials for more
details on S and the sequence comparison function).
P(s′|si) = ι(s






Following the evidence for a fluency effect that accumulates the
repeated success in correctly predicting and selecting actions
(Chambon et al., 2014), we model this accumulation of evidence.
That is, we feed the likelihood of the current action of the
intended sequence sI into a Kalman filter to estimate the agency
(see Equation 5). The Kalman filter estimates the agency aˆt from
the likelihood P(s′|sI) and the previous agency estimate aˆt−1, the
Kalman gain Kt is calculated from the sequence level’s free energy
FS and precision πS. This form of Bayesian belief updating is
implemented as follows (noting that the conventional update of




aˆt = aˆt−1 + Kt(P(s
′|sI)− aˆt−1)
(5)
By allowing the agency estimate only to accumulate through
this filter, strong fluctuations are dampened. Further, with the
gain governed by precision and free energy the influence of
the estimate will strongly depend on the success of previous
predictions. The essential elements for the sense of agency of
the perception-action loop are an intent for a specific action
production, the correct prediction of the action, and its timing,
which was learned. In our generative model in the Sequence level,
the prediction and evaluation of an action and its timing are
embedded in each sequence. The comparison function returns a
value between 0 and 1. The intent for a specific action production
essentially can be described as a high precision prediction that
is very strong and stable over time. If it is then the case that
such a high precision prediction is the driving signal and the
probability for the predicted sequence stays low, the model free
energy will be high. Our interpretation of this process and its
outcome is that either something unpredicted is influencing the
action production or it is not the system’s production at all that is
perceived.
5. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
To test the extended model’s ability to solve the problem of
the dual use of the sensorimotor system and of differentiating
between self and other, we have simulated a number of scenarios
and trained HPBU on a corpus of handwritten digits from 0 to
9. The handwriting corpus was previously recorded using a self-
implemented app on an 6th generation iPad using the Apple
Pencil as an input device. Each digit was recorded ten times by the
same person. The learned temporal and spatial dynamics were
learned by the system to allow for both the spatial and temporal
information to influence the correct production and perception
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of a writing sequence. We leave the details of how HPBU learns
new representations to a future publication.
We simulated the production and perception of hand written
digits in four scenarios and over time recorded the respective
changes in free energy, probability distribution and the sense of
agency estimate. First, we simulated the pure perception of (a) a
known sequence of actions to write a digit and (b) an unknown
way to write a digit. Then, we simulated the writing of a digit
with (c) correct visual and proprioceptive feedback. To simulate
scenarios in which the distinction of self and other is relevant
(d) we had the model write a digit, gave the correct temporal
and spatial proprioceptive feedback, but gave temporal and spatial
visual feedback of a different (but known) way to write another
digit. Figure 3 shows the probability dynamics in the model
as heatmaps of the probability distributions over time in the
different levels of the HPBU hierarchy for the different scenarios.
The heatmap color codes the probability distributions from dark
green to white for best differentiability. Each heatmap shows the
level’s posterior probabilities after beliefs are updated bottom-
up and top-down. Simultaneously, the free energy dynamics
are plotted for each level, showing the level of adaptation and
model evidence given the current state of the system. The bottom
row represents activity in the Motor Control level, which is
non-existent in the purely perceptual scenarios (a) and (b).
In scenario (a) the heatmaps show nicely how the Vision
level perceives the different movement angles over time.
Simultaneously, evidence for the sequence hypotheses
accumulates slowly with each new salient visual feature,
finally leading to at first only a limited number of probable
sequence representations and finally to a single one. Also, the
schema hypotheses accumulate evidence even more slowly,
predicting the underlying sequences. Schema level predictions
have a strong influence on the Sequence level which is most
evident in the final Sequence level distributions in which only a
number of sequences are still probable and most of them belong
the the most probable schema hypothesis. In scenario (b) no
such evidence accumulation is present, as the shown digit was
not known.
Between scenarios (c) and (d) the most important difference
can be seen between Motor Control and Vision levels of each.
There, the posterior probabilities shown in the Motor Control
level heatmap should be similar to the Vision level heatmap,
but is only so in scenario (c), where production and perception
align. To that effect, the heatmaps of Sequence and Schema levels
show how evidence for predictions cannot be met in scenario (d),
but are mostly met in scenario (c). Interestinly, in scenario (c)
evidence for the first predicted sequence is not met at some point,
so that another viable sequence hypothesis from the same schema
hypothesis becomes active after some time. This pertubation may
be due to spring dynamics in the Motor Control.
Having a look at the free energy throughout the hierarchy can
give us an idea how well the model is able to find explanations for
the perceived input. Strong fluctuations can be a clue to highly
irregular input, e.g., in the vision level where bottom-up sensory
evidence and top-down predictions can change rapidly. To get
a better idea for the model’s explanatory power in our case, i.e.,
the perception and production of sequences of writing digits,
the sequence level’s free energy dynamics can quickly respond to
unpredicted input but still receives predictions from the schema
level to inhibit the most unlikely explanations.
In Figure 4 we plot the free energy dynamics of the sequence
level during each test scenario. As the different writing sequences
are of different length, so are the model responses shown in this
figure. The free energy plots show a successful minimization in
scenario (a) where the model perceives a known stimulus. It
appears to quickly choose the correct hypotheses right from the
beginning. In contrast, the model cannot successfully minimize
its free energy in response to perceiving the unknown stimulus
in scenario (b). Interestingly, in response to the production in
scenario (c) the model first minimizes free energy, acting out a
chosen sequence, but free energy spikes during production as
some dynamics during motor control have not been predicted.
In the end the sequence hypothesis switches to a similar sequence
from the same schema and free energy minimization continues.
In scenario (d) the production and proprioceptive feedback of
one written out digit is met be the visual temporal and spatial
feedback of another digit. The free energy can thus not be
minimized as predictions from schema and sequence levels are
not met by correct visual feedback.
We are interested in the SoA estimate calculated during active
inference in order to see how well the model can be sure if
it actually has acted on the world as expected. We ran two
test scenarios, (c) and (d), where the model produced a writing
sequence so only those are interesting to inspect its inferred
SoA estimate. In Figure 5 we plot the SoA estimate dynamics
produced in the scenarios (c) (production with correct feedback)
and (d) (production with incorrect feedback). As one can see, the
later scenario didn’t take as long as the other to complete and
in both scenarios the SoA can accumulate up to a certain point,
but remains at a rather low level of 0.2 in the end of scenario
(d), because temporal and spatial predictions about produced
actions are met with contradicting visual feedback. In contrast,
the SoA estimate can quickly accumulate quite high in scenario
(c), despite the spring dynamics during motor control, that lead
to a spike in free energy and a switch to a different sequence
hypothesis.
6. DISCUSSION
In dynamic social scenarios of concurrent perception and
production of actions, where sensory events can originate either
from own or from other’s actions, a "dual-use" sensorimotor
system that is presumed to be involved in both processes
has a challenging task. Specifically, it needs to distinguish in
its processing between self-action and other-action, subserving
its functions for action execution and recognition. We have
presented a model called empirical belief correcting hierarchy
based on active inference and extended it with mechanisms of
a SoA that enables the judgement—already at these levels of
sensorimotor processing—that an action is self-generated. In
line with current views on SoA, this extension consists in a
dynamic integration of predictive and postdictive cues which is
embedded in the likelihood function that matches temporal and
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FIGURE 3 | We show the probability dynamics in the model as heatmaps over the probability distributions over time in the different levels of the HPBU (color coded
from dark green to white from P = 0 to P = 0.6 for best differentiability). The different scenarios are (A) perceived known: the perception of a known digit (here a 5),
(B) perceived unknown: the perception of an unknown digit (here a 4), (C) produced correct feedback: the production of a digit by means of active inference
(here the digit 9), and (D) produced incorrect feedback: the production of a digit (here a 1), using the correct proprioceptive feedback while the simulated
production of another digit (here a 3) is received as visual feedback. In addition the free energy dynamics for each level is shown. As one can see, the visual input
clearly influences the perception of sequences and schemas of sequences in higher levels, thereby minimizing free energy over time. Also, during production the belief
created in the schema representing the digit 9 percolates down the hierarchy, activating and acting out a selected sequence. In scenario (d) the sequential activation is
shown for producing one digit in the motor control level, while seeing the activation dynamics for visually perceiving another digit in the vision level. The resulting
confusion is immediately visible in sequence level, and reduces in schema level by settling on a lower probability for the preferred hypothesis.
spatial aspects of perceived action sequences with those of known
sequences.
The resulting dynamics of our simulation scenarios show
the successful minimization of free energy during perception
and production (see scenarios a and c in Figure 3). There,
over time the different possible schemas and their sequences
are either considered as possible explanations for the perceived
stimuli, or the sequences and actions are chosen for the
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FIGURE 4 | Here we plot the free energy of the sequence level during each
test scenario. The different sequences perceived or produced in each scenario
have different lenghts. First, the perception of a known and unknown writing
sequence clearly shows a difference in that free energy is minimized during
perception of the former sequence, but not the later. Second, the production
of a writing sequence also minimizes free energy as it would in active inference
as long as the sequential production is successfull, i.e., the temporal and
spatial prediction of sequential acts are met. In production scenario (d) with
incorrect feedback these predictions are met only proprioceptively but not
visually. This shows in the plot where free energy cannot be minimized through
active inference when its action driving predictions are met with contradicting
visual feedback.
FIGURE 5 | Here we see the SoA estimate dynamics produced by the HPBU
in the production scenarios (c) and (d) with correct and incorrect feedback,
respectively. Production and perception in the later scenario didn’t take as long
as in the scenario (c). In both scenarios the SoA estimate rises up to a certain
point but it remains at a low level of 0.2 in scenario (d) where predictions of
produced actions are met with contradicting visual feedback.
intended schema to be acted out. In both cases free energy is
minimized. In the perception case the minimization is due to
the selection of possible explanations, which then can correctly
predict further aspects of the action. In the production case
the correct selection and prediction of action effects that allow
for the intended schema to be a possible explanation leads
to the free energy minimization. In both cases free energy is
not merely an epiphenomenon of the system, i.e., an acausal
property that results from the system dynamics. Free energy
is part of the belief update scheme that integrates top-down
and bottom-up posteriors, by influencing the Kalman gain that
allows for the signal to influence the prior. Dependend on the
current mode, whether free energy is minimized through action
or perception, the top-down and bottom-up posteriors take
different roles (prior or signal) in this update scheme. In addition,
free energy also similarly to the belief update scheme, controls
the precision or Kalman gain controlling the accumulation of
the continuous SoA estimate. Together, this qualifies as active
inference. Furthermore, the implementation we present here
can be described as an example of a “deep temporal model”
(Friston et al., 2017b). For example, during bottom-up inference
the model accumulates evidence over time to consider different
possible explanations, and top-down a state at any level of the
model hierarchy can entail a sequence of state transitions in its
next lower level.
A possible line of criticism is that we control for our
simulation scenarios which mode the model finds itself in,
through our intention signal. The intention signal is received by
the Schema level and tags one of its hypotheses for production
in active inference. Then, using additional connections to other
levels in the hierarchy the intention is spread, giving, and
maintaining a boost of probability to associated hypotheses in
those levels. In our implementation we found this maintained
probability boost to be necessary for the inference to inhibit
sudden switches to other explanations (and action sequences).
This maintained probability or activation is similar to activity
that is maintained during attentional tasks in area MT (Treue
and Martínez Trujillo, 1999), i.e., where monkeys were tasked to
follow a single moving visual stimulus while other movements
were also on display. Naturally, the probability of intended
sequences should be maintained through the correct prediction
of actions. In reality small differences in the feedback to
early actions of an action sequence can lead to increased
probabilities of more similar sequences that not always belong
to the intended schema. Even with the intention signal in our
production scenario c), small unpredicted pertubations in the
spring dynamics of Motor Control led to a switch to a similar
sequence from the intended schema. We argue that while such
an intention signal seems artificial in our implementation, it is
necessary in a limited hierarchy, such as ours. It may well be
the case that in an extended hierarchy the maintained boost in
probability may be provided by higher levels through appropriate
priors.
During scenario (b) an unknown writing sequence was
perceived and free energy could not be minimized, although the
Schema level seems to settle for one possible hypothesis. In the
Sequence level no viable hypothesis can be found and free energy
stays high. In our implementation this maintained inability to
minimize free energy is a reliable signal for the need to extend
upon possible hypotheses to choose from. As such, Bayesian
models lack the ability to extended upon their hypothesis space
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for the reason that renormalization becomes necessary. In a
hierarchical model such an additional sequence would have to be
associated with a corresponding schema in the Schema level in
order to embed and associate it with similar sequences, if there
are any. For a sequence such as which was used in scenario (b)
no similar sequence could be found simply because the model
was not trained on these. Specifically, from all digits seens during
learning, all writing sequences of fours have been excluded. This
way, no similar sequence could be found which could have
explained the perceived stimuli. For HPBU learning this not
only means that another sequence should be learned, but also
the addition of a new schema becomes necessary. The learning
strategy is still in its early stages, thus we do not go into much
detail here and leave this for future work.
The results of our simulations show (see Figure 5) that the cue
integration mechanism, which is integrated into the likelihood
function of the Sequence level, supports results reported in the
literature. First, it is sound with regard to results where the
reliability (here: precision) of the predictive process was reduced
and the system put more weight on postdictive processes,
conforming evidence for a weighted integration based on the
cues’ precision (Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013;
Wolpe et al., 2014). This aspect can be observed in scenario
(d), where the SoA estimate increases slowly even though a
completely different digit is being perceived visually. This may
be due to the fact that when drawn simultaneously, a perceived
3 and a drawn 1 start similarly, despite the roundness in the
trajectory of a three. When either timing or spatial predictions
are met to a degree they can accumulate. In our simulation it is
then only the lower, second curved trajectory of the 3 that is in
total contrast to the trajectory of the 1, which finally prohibits
further accumulation of agency. Second, our results are in line
with a fluent correct prediction of actions (Chambon et al., 2014).
The accumulation of the SoA estimate over time is done using a
Kalman Filter, which depending on the current free energy and
precision of the sequence level, filters out strong fluctuations. The
more accurate the hierarchy’s predictions the faster the uptake of
SoA evidence (positive and negative). Looking at scenario (c), this
may be the reason why the later spike in free energy can stop the
further increase of SoA, which plateaus in the end. Finally, even
though the cue integration model is flexible with regard to the
precision of predictive and postdictive cues, scenario (d) showed
that a false attribution of SoA is not likely when both cues show
no signs of agency.
Other than Friston et al. (2011), who rely heavily on
proprioceptive information we allowed for visual information
to solely drive motor coordination. We closed the motor
coordination loop using a direct connection that is used by
the Motor Control level to inform the Vision level when it is
done coordinating actions to reach a subgoal. Vision level will
then check if visual information can confirm the movement and
close the motor coordination loop by sending the information
to Sequence level. Using a motor coordination loop that heavily
depends on visual information allowed us to easily trick the
model into doubting its own action production, by feeding it
visual information of a different writing sequence, as in scenario
(d), the production with incorrect feedback.
Overall, the results reported here show that the model’s
attribution of SoA to its own action outcomes is affected in
relatively realistic and, more importantly, differentiated ways
when receiving different simultaneous perceptual information.
This suggests, at least to some extent, that the motor system can
play an important role in realtime social cognition as proposed
by Schütz-Bosbach et al. (2006). Still, the literature on the social
brain suggests that motor cognition as well as the distinction of
self and other are influenced by higher-level processes, causal
beliefs, and the mentalizing network. We agree that the interplay
between mentalizing and mirroring needs to be incorporated
to meet the demands of truly social systems in interaction
scenarios with multiple agents. Also, we need to mention that
since this is a deterministic model with a representation size
that can be handled without any need for sampling we report
purely qualitative descriptions of our simulation results. Also, we
have disabled learning during our simulation runs, so that every
simulation will return the same results, without any variance. A
line of criticismmight be that from themere attribution of SoA to
an action in our HPBU model we can hardly deduce more than a
kind of tagging of an action within the hierarchy. But we think
that when the current conceptual model is embedded within
an extended HPBU model that will also cover the functionality
of mentalizing areas, an agency attribution will help to confirm
motor beliefs attributed to a prospective model of the self or
distinguish its own actions from those of an interaction partner.
7. CONCLUSION
Wehave presentedHierarchical Predictive Belief Update (HPBU)
whichmodels a predictive sensorimotor hierarchy.We integrated
HPBU with a model of the sense of agency, which allows to
dynamically integrate cues for sense of agency (SoA). This SoA
attribution to an action enables the judgement that an action
is self-generated. At the core of this modeling approach is the
assumption that we strongly rely on the predictability of our
own body to be able to differentiate between our own and
other’s actions through the information gathered especially from
the unpredictability of others. The functional simulation helped
to evaluate that the identified mechanisms in the model are
sufficient to correctly infer own actions from feedback to its
action production.
Furthermore, we presented simulation results of different
scenarios of perception and production. We discussed how the
model’s dynamics and how it is able to minimize its free energy in
each situation. In two scenarios we simulated action productions
in which the SoA could be inferred and compared them to the
literature on SoA and the influence of the motor system on social
cognition. This comparison suggests that HPBU can correctly
attribute SoA for its own actions, using a flexible integration of
predictive and postdictive cues while integrating the evidence
over time.
We made the model’s sequence coordination independent of
direct proprioceptive feedback by closing the motor coordination
loop via the Vision level, without direct Motor Control level to
Sequence level connection. This may have broad implications
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for the coordination and association of actions in the world
with distal effects that do not directly or necessarily feed back
into motor coordination. One example is the association of a
switch on the wall with the distal effect of switching on the light
on the ceiling. A more social example is the association of an
action on another agent like smiling, with the effect of influencing
that agent’s emotional state. We want to explore this exciting
possibility in future work.
The presented work is part of a research project investigating
computational mechanisms underlying the intra-personal
interplay between mentalizing and mirroring and the inter-
personal coordination between interaction partners. We believe
that computational cognitive modeling such as ours can be
informative to the investigation of social cognitive processes
which neuroscience is currently not yet able to elucidate, but
where an analysis of the behavior of cognitive models based on
findings from the neuroscientific literature can help to shed some
light.
In future work, we want to improve our setup by making
use of the information provided by the present model of self-
other distinction to inform computational models of higher-
level cognition through an interplay with the mentalizing
system, in the process helping it to grasp another agent’s
intentions and beliefs. In a first step toward this belief
attribution we explored a rule based mentalizing model in
previous work (Kahl and Kopp, 2015). Here, we lay the
foundation to integrate a mentalizing model (higher-level social
cognition) with the HPBU model on the common basis
of active inference. This way, the mentalizing model will
naturally be informed by a model of the sensorimotor system,
while influencing it through its predictions. We conjecture
that this interplay between the mentalizing and sensorimotor
systems can yield the distinction between one’s own and an
interaction partner’s beliefs needed in social interaction, where
informed reciprocity is the key to efficient and successful
communication.
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